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Somalia has been a failed state since 1991, which has made it questionable whether the 
country would be able to rebuild its state. This thesis aims at understanding the factors 
affecting the state-building process in the country based on voices from interviewees 
belonging to the “International community” and the “Somali diaspora”. To gain an 
understanding of what implications the factors could have on the reconstitution of a Somali 
state, a Weberian inspired theoretical framework was applied. This thesis argues that three 
main categories i.e. political, social and economic factors can be identified as having 
implications on the state-building process. However, the political aspects are highlighted as 
the most important. Furthermore it is argued that the ideal state model, as a Eurocentric 
discourse, evolves to the “hegemonic powers” advantage, thus supporting their dominant 
position, which makes it questionable if the Somali state can adapt to such a model. 
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1. Introduction  
“Before you can have democracy or economic development, you have to have a state”.1 But, 
how does a country build a state? During the 1980s and early 1990s a neoliberal
i
 view 
dominated development policy discussions; thus, questions of state-building and state 
capacity were excluded. As part of the push for liberalization and a minimalistic state, the 
scope of the state was reduced in developing countries through privatization, subsidy cuts, 
deregulation etc. However, these donor-imposed programs were often counterproductive. In 
many African states for example, former colonial administrative systems existed alongside 
neopatrimonial
ii
 regimes that competed for resources and often felt threatened by Weberian 
rational bureaucracy. Donor conditionality was therefore used as an excuse by regimes to 
expand and protect the scope of the neopatrimonial state, while reducing the “modern” state 
sectors.
2
 Today, several African states are among the weakest in the world;
3
 unable to 
preserve rule of law, guarantee territorial integrity and support development among other 
Weberian state functions.
4
 During the 1990s, the weakness or collapse of these states resulted 
in human rights and humanitarian disasters in countries like Haiti, Cambodia, East Timor and 
Somalia.
5
 Subsequently, it has been concluded that development is mostly affected by 
institutional and political rather than economic factors.
6
 
    In the case of Somalia, there was an inability to establish a central government after the 
downfall of the dictatorial Barre regime in 1991. In a state of anarchy, clan-based groupings 
(Somaliland and Puntland) and militant Islamic groupings (southern and central Somalia) 
gained control of different parts of the country.
7
 Several internal and external actors tried and 
failed in reconstructing the Somali state. Due to these failures, the world community’s 
involvement in the country was reduced to food aid.
8
 However, as global problems such as 
terrorism, poverty, trafficking and AIDS are seen as closely related to weakness or failure of 
states,
9
 the world once again turned its attention to Somalia during the 21
st
 century as the 
                                                          
1 Fukuyama, Francis. “STATENESS” FIRST. Journal of  Democracy, Vol.16, Nr.1, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005 p.84 
[DOI: 10.1353/jod.2005.0006] 
2 Fukuyama, Francis. The Imperative of  State-Building. Journal of  Democracy, Vol.15, Nr.2, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004, 
pp.26-29 [DOI: 10.1353/jod.2004.0026] 
3 Jackson, Robert H. and Rosberg, Carl G. Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood. World Politics, 
Vol. 35, No. 1, Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp.1-24 [ISSN:0043-8871] 
4 Verhoeven, Harry. The self-fulfilling prophecy of  failed states: Somalia, state collapse and the Global War on Terror. Journal of  Eastern 
African Studies Vol. 3, No. 3, 2009, pp.405-425 [DOI: 10.1080/17531050903273719] 
5 Fukuyama 2004:18  
6 Ibid. pp.26-29  
7 Normark, Sture. ‘Inbördeskriget’. In Lena Hagberg (ed.), Somalier : grundinformation. Norrköping: Statens Invandrarverk, 1993 
p.25; Leonard, David K. with Samantar, Mohamed S.. What Does the Somali Experience Teach Us about the Social Contract and the State?. 
International Institute of  Social Studies, Development and Change 42(2), Published by Blackwell Publishing, 2011 p.559 [DOI: 
10.1111/j.1467-7660.2011.01702.x]  
8 Shinn, David H. ‘Somalia and the International Community: Facing Reality’. In Ulf  Johansson Dahre (ed.), Predicaments in the 
Horn of  Africa: 10 years of  SIRC Conferences in Lund on the Horn of  Africa. Lund: Media-Tryck, Lund University, 2012, p.15 
9 Fukuyama 2004:17-18 
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instable situation in the country affected both regional and international peace and security.
10
 
It is therefore questionable whether a Weberian state, that has monopolized the legitimate 
claim on force within a territorial jurisdiction,
11
 can be established. A post-transitional 
government, which was established in August 2012 to assist the state building process in 
Somalia, is experiencing dire obstacles.
12
  
    This has been the basis of the research question this thesis has been built around: What 
factors are important in the reconstitution of the Somali state? This thesis aims at 
understanding the factors that could affect the state-building process in Somalia based on 
views of interviewees from both the “Somali diaspora” and the “International community”. 
The identified factors are analyzed in relation to a theoretical framework, which is mainly 
based on the Weberian concept of state, since it is a guideline for defining a state. Rousseau’s 
concept of the social contract is also consulted in this framework, as it is assumed that the 
state is established on the basis of such a contract. According to D.K. Leonard and M.S. 
Samantar “[t]hese assumptions and attendant ones about how a social contract is established 
implicitly guide most international efforts to deal with collapsed states.”13 These conceptual 
tools are complimented with other theories that expand the possibilities for analyzing the 
identified factors.  
    The study is delimited in accordance to ethnic heritage, political knowledge and residency 
in Sweden, when it comes to the interviewees belonging to the category “Somali diaspora”. 
The “International community” is delimited to non-ethnic Somalis, who have worked with 
questions concerning Somali state-building, peacekeeping and human rights etc. Both of these 
communities can be seen as consisting of several different actors, therefore the interviewees 
opinions are not seen as representative for the whole community. 
    This thesis has been structured so that previous research is firstly presented to give a brief 
insight into the field that is followed by the theoretical framework on which this thesis is built. 
This section is accompanied by a short description of the limitations of a Weberian 
framework. After a methodological discussion, a historical background gives a contextual 
framework to highlight the internal and external aspects of the Somali state-building process. 
Thereafter, main factors identified by the interviewees shall be presented with an analysis 
based on the theoretical framework. This thesis will end with a critical discussion highlighting 
                                                          
10 Frisell, Eva Hagström; Lindell, Magdalena Tham and Skeppström, Emma. Land i sikte? – EU:s samlade ansats gentemot Somalia. 
Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), Report nr: FOI-R--3462--SE, 2012, p.9;14-15 
11 Weber, Max. The Theory of  Social and Economic Organization. (n.d.) Trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, New York: The 
Free Press, 1964, p.154 
12 UNDPA (United Nations Department of  Political Affairs). Somalia. (n.d.) 
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/activities_by_region/africa/somalia (Retrieved April 29th 2013) 
13 Leonard with Samantar p.560   
3 
 
the limitations of the Weberian ideal state model in its application to the Somali stat-building 
process.   
 
2. Previous research  
Several studies have been done on failed or weak African states, where focus mainly has been 
on factors contributing to their failure. Since 9/11 this particular phenomena has been 
associated with terrorism, transnational crime etc. according to Harry Verhoeven. Verhoeven 
challenges this “Orthodox Failed State Narrative”, which parallels state failure with terrorism 
and anarchy, by emphasizing the development of political entities capable of providing 
stability and order within the Somali territory.
14
 In comparison to Verhoeven’s study, a 
critical approach to international narratives is not taken in this thesis. However, of particular 
importance for this study is one of Verhoeven’s concluding remarks, which highlights the 
difficulties with reconstituting a Somali state:     
 
The international community would do well to enter into far more dynamic, 
nuanced engagements with collapsed states - instead of being (selfishly) security-
obsessed, it should explore how alternative forms of legitimate political authority 
can help bring about the substantive freedoms people need to realise their 
fundamental aspirations.
15
 
 
This is also a factor Leonard with Samantar point to, when they state that:  
 
[…] the fixation of the international community on state governance has inhibited 
the development of other, more feasible, forms of governance (which, even if 
imperfect, would be better than the collapsed states)
16
 
 
In contrary to Verhoeven, Leonard with Samantar tries to gain knowledge about the social 
contract through highlighting contemporary Somali polities, while the social contract in this 
study is used as an analytical tool applied on interview material.
17
  
     Furthermore, researchers, like Hussein Ahmed Warsame
18
, Mwangi S. Kimenyi et.al.
19
 and 
J. Peter Pham
20
, have also focused on the process of reconstituting a Somali state, not least 
concerning the international involvement in such a transformative process. Similar to this 
                                                          
14 Verhoeven p.405-25 
15 Ibid. p.418 
16 Leonard with Samantar p.561 
17 Ibid.  
18 Warsame, Hussein Ahmed. Role of  International Aid and Open Trade Policies in Rebuilding the Somali State. Bildhaan, An International 
Journal of  Somali Studies. 2011, Vol. 11, pp51-72 [ISSN:15286258] 
19 Kimenyi, Mwangi S.; Mbaku, John Mukum and Moyo, Nelipher. Reconstituting Africa's Failed States: The Case of  Somalia. Social 
Research, Vol. 77. Issue 4, 2010, pp.1339-1366 [ISSN:0037783X] 
20 Pham, J. Peter. State Collapse, Insurgency, and Famine in the Horn of  Africa: Legitimacy and the Ongoing Somali Crisis. Journal of  the 
Middle East and Africa, 2 Taylor & Francis Group, 2011, pp.153–187 [DOI: 10.1080/21520844.2011.617238] 
4 
 
thesis, Kimenyi et.al. include the Weberian concept of state. However, it is used as a tool to 
characterize state failure,
21
 which is not the objective of this study.   
 
3. Theoretical framework  
The starting point of the following theoretical framework is the political sociology of Max 
Weber, where the main concepts of state and legitimacy are outlined. Thereafter, the basis for 
building a state is predominantly founded on Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of social 
contract. Rousseau was an advocator for egalitarianism; i.e. the equality of humans; equal 
voting rights for all men (excluding women) and participatory democracy.
22
 As these concepts 
are similar to those of the traditional Somali kinship system (see Pre-colonization: 
Traditional kinship society) Rousseau’s concept of social contract is seen as most applicable 
in the case of Somalia in relation to other contractual theorists. Furthermore, as Michel 
Foucault states that power is everywhere,
23
 this concept of power is seen to enable a wide 
applicability in the case of the Somali state-building process. In addition, John Searle’s theory 
on the construction of social reality is seen as a compliment to these theories.  
 
State-building   
What is a state? In the Weberian sense a state has monopolized the legitimate claim on force 
within a given territorial jurisdiction. Weber describes it as:  
 
A compulsory political association with continuous organization (politischer 
Anstaltsbetrieb) will be called a ‘state’ if and in so far as its administrative staff 
successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force in the enforcement of its order.
24
 
 
Furthermore, characteristic for the modern state is the existence of rule of law, i.e. a legal and 
administrative order, which is changeable by law. The rule of law holds authority over 
citizens and all actions taken within its territory.
25
   
    There are two distinguishing aspects of the Weberian ideal state. Firstly, the definition 
implies a form of bureaucratic apparatus i.e. administrative staff. Secondly, the administrative 
authoritative rule is established on a monopoly of legitimate use of force. Thereby, legitimacy 
of authority must exist when enforcing order. However, “no system of authority voluntarily 
limits itself to the appeal to material or affectual or ideal motives on as the basis of 
                                                          
21 Kimenyi, Mbaku and Moyo pp.1339-1366  
22 Lewin, Leif. ‘Inledning’. 1993. In Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Om Samhällsfördraget eller Statsrättens grunder. 1762. Trans. Sven Åke Heed 
and Jan Stolpe, Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 2009 pp.9-10   
23 Hörnqvist, Magnus. Foucaults maktanalys. Stockholm: Carlsson Bokförlag, 1996, pp.28-9 
24 Weber p.154 
25 Ibid. pp.154-156 
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guaranteeing its continuance”,26 according to Weber. Moreover, variations in obedience and 
exercising authority for example depend on the type of legitimacy that is claimed. Weber 
identifies three ideal types of legitimate authority; legal, traditional and charismatic authority; 
each with a different basis for legitimacy. Within a system of impersonal order, legitimacy is 
obtained on a rational basis i.e. the belief that authority will follow the rule of law, thus legal 
authority is achieved, which is in accordance with the Weberian definition of a modern state. 
If legitimacy is, however, based on the sanctity of tradition; as in kinship systems, monarchies 
among others; the obligation of obedience is a matter of personal loyalty, whereby traditional 
authority is attained. In the case of charismatic authority, an individual’s characteristic 
qualities are the basis for obedience.
27
 By obeying authority, order can be enforced and if the 
states monopoly of force is seen as legitimate by the member of the state the states survival 
chances are improved. The monopoly of the use of force is according to Weber an essential 
character of the modern state.
28
  
     Theoretically, states can be seen as built through warfare or on the basis of a social 
contract. According to Charles Tilly, warfare created the European state apparatus, based on 
interaction between military machinery and the development of the market.
29
 Through 
increasing control and monitoring means of violence,
30
 power holders concentrated the means 
of coercion within a territory.
31
 Additionally, an administrative state structure was created to 
control and extract resources from the population for sustaining the army. Thereby, power 
holders became involved in capital accumulation, dispute settlements, distribution of services 
and goods, among other things.
32
 However, Tilly's theory on state-building through warfare is 
not applicable to post-colonial African states, which inherited administrative systems
33
 and 
were territorially divided by former colonial powers.
34
 Yet, as the African continent is 
currently facing several intra-and-interstate conflicts,
35
 the emergence of new state formations 
cannot be excluded, which the division of Sudan
36
 exemplifies. Therefore, state-building 
through warfare might still be a plausible way for establishing a state. 
                                                          
26 Weber p.325 
27 Ibid. pp.325-28 
28 Ibid. p.156 
29 Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., (revised paperback edition), 
1992. p.94 
30 Ibid. p.68 
31 Ibid. p.20 
32 Ibid. pp.19-20 
33 Fukuyama 2004:26-29 
34 Lewis, Ioan M. A Modern History of  Somalia – Nation and State in the Horn of  Africa. London: Longman Group Ltd., 1980.p. iv 
35 Wai, Zubairu. Neo-patrimonialism and the discourse of  state failure in Africa. Review of  African Political Economy, Vol.39 Nr.131, 
2012, p. 29 [http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2012.658719]  
36 Bereketeab, Redie. Self-Determination and Secessionism in Somaliland and South Sudan: challenges to postcolonial state-building. Discussion 
paper 75; Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala. Milton Keynes: Lightning Source UK Ltd., 2012, p.11 
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    On the other hand, contractual theorist Rousseau asserts that when humans lack the power 
to overcome the obstacles of their preservation in the state of nature, the only means for 
survival is uniting their powers.
37
 However, Rousseau states that the difficulty is:  
 
[…] to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole 
common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while 
uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as 
before.
38
  
 
The solution is the social contact, by which each individual unites himself and his power in 
command under the general will, and in their shared capacity each member becomes an 
inseparable part of the whole.
39
 Moreover, the general will is based on common denominators 
of different interests, thus, society should be governed by the general will.
40
 Ergo, this 
contract creates a unified moral and collective body, with a common will. The public person, 
formed by the unification of people, constitutes the state.
41
  
     Despite losing one’s natural freedom through contractual consolidation, the individual 
gains civil liberties, moral liberty and the proprietorship of his possessions. Through moral 
liberty i.e. obeying laws that he himself has prescribed, the individual acquires freedom 
within the state.
42
 Hence, the purpose of the social contract is the prosperity and preservation 
of its members.
43
 It can be seen as regulating the relationship between the state and its 
citizens.
44
 However, if the social contract is breached the state dissolves into anarchy.
45
  
    In both Weber’s and Rousseau’s conceptual frameworks forces of power are highlighted in 
different ways. The states capacity to enforce order is based on its ability to monopolize force, 
which is dependent on its ability to gain obedience, and ultimately through legitimacy of 
authority it gains power through the members of the state. For Rousseau the social contract is 
a consolidation of power; the unification of each members force; thus the construction of a 
contract is built around the concept of power. Furthermore, within the state the general will, 
can be seen as holding power over the single individual, however, as he is a constituent of the 
public body, he gains power in the form of moral liberty. Thus, power relationships are 
illustrated through the social contract. Similarly, power plays a role within the state-building 
                                                          
37 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Om Samhällsfördraget eller Statsrättens grunder. 1762. Trans. Sven Åke Heed and Jan Stolpe, Stockholm: 
Natur & Kultur, 2009, p.27  
38 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. 1761. Trans. G.D.H. Cole. New York: Prometheus Books, 1988.p.23   
39 Rousseau 2009:29 
40 Ibid. p.39 
41 Ibid. p.30   
42 Ibid. p.33-34 
43 Ibid. p.99 
44 Ibid. p.47 
45 Ibid. pp.102-03 
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process presented by Tilly, in which power holder concentrate power over a territory, army 
and population. 
    Foucault states that power is everywhere, as it is exercised in the interaction between 
people or groups of people, thereby power is a relationship. It is dynamic; constantly active 
and changeable within relative strengths. Relative strengths of people or groups of people 
exist in power relationships.
46
 An important aspect of Foucault’s concept of power is that it is 
not limited to state-centric power struggles.
47
 The relative strengths within interpersonal 
relationships are dependent on differences in for example ethnicity, knowledge, gender, and 
social position. However, the degree of relevance and importance of these factors are decided 
by deeper power structures,
48
 as some power relationships can become institutionalized,
49
 and 
power relationships and their power techniques can become intertwined and develop into 
bigger institutions if they find support within each other.
50
 Each power relationship holds a 
momentary position within a continuous struggle. The existence of diverse relative strengths 
within power relationships, in a context, constitutes the continuous struggle that increases risk 
or chance for transformation of the relative strengths within each power relationship. 
Therefore, transformation of the power relationship is affected by other relative strengths and 
conditions, thus, the subordinate actor might not actively guard their interests as the dominant 
actor due to having a higher chance of changing their position within another power 
relationship.
51
 Furthermore, Foucault point to the relationship between power and knowledge, 
and states that the utilization of knowledge increases the relative strengths within power 
relations and enables the exercise of power.
52
 The interplay between power and knowledge 
signifies the constitution of power through accepted forms of knowledge, “truth” and 
scientific understanding. According to Foucault, each society has a regime of truth i.e. a 
system of truth conditions, discourses and theories, which has evolved within the local 
continuous struggle. When well established, this regime of truth becomes the basis for the 
relative strengths within power relationships in a society. Furthermore it functions as a 
fulcrum for the dominating actor’s exercise of power.53  
        As the interplay between the concept of state, state-building (through warfare or social 
contract) and power have been illustrated, the remaining question is: How are these concepts 
                                                          
46 Hörnqvist p.28-30 
47 Ibid. p.50 
48 Ibid. p.52 
49 Ibid. p.47 
50 Ibid. p.55 
51 Ibid. p.37-8 
52 Ibid. p.153 
53 Ibid. pp.165-9 
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shared in social reality? According to Searle some facts, so called institutional facts, within 
social reality only exist on the basis of human institutions.
54
 Humans assign certain functions 
to objects, which are assigned in relation to the users and the observers’ interests. Thereby, it 
is assigned functions that are not possible merely based on the objects physical attributes.
55
 
However, human institutions, which create institutional facts, are based on collectively 
accepted rules.
56
 These facts are created through the application of certain rules that exist 
within this system, whereby the status of an assigned function is collectively acknowledged.
57
 
Thus, a specific object (X) is identified as (Y) in a specific context (C).
58
 Subsequently, the 
assigned status function (Y) also allots a subject with certain deontic power i.e. obligations, 
rights, restrictions etc.
59
  
    Hence, in reference to Searle’s concept of institution, legitimacy of authority within a state 
is based on collectively identifying a specific authority (X) as having legitimacy (Y) within a 
given territory (C), and the basis for legitimacy i.e. the collectively accepted rules are either 
legal, traditional or charismatic, according to Weber. Thus, the status function of legitimacy 
assigns this authority with deontic power. In a similar way the social contract can be 
interpreted; by commonly identifying the social contract (X) as regulating the relationship 
between state and citizen (Y) within a society (C) deontic power is created.   
 
Limitations of Weber’s conceptual framework 
Western imperialism associated with modernity, capitalism and economic development 
becomes ground for post-colonial critique; focusing on deterministic Eurocentric frameworks 
of classic sociologists like Weber, Durkheim and Marx. According to Manuela Boatcă, the 
means through which Weber validates his theory i.e. contrasting with non-Western societies is 
problematic.
60
 Furthermore, Boatcă states that this later developed into a dichotomy between 
modern Western rationality and traditional societies, used by modernization theorists to locate 
societies at different development stages, “thus completing active production of non-Western 
as absence of modernity”.61 In the same vein, Zubairu Wai states that the conceptual 
framework of state rationality is:  
 
                                                          
54 Hörnqvist pp.15-16 
55 Searle, John R. Konstruktionen av den sociala verkligheten. Trans. Staffan Ahlin, Göteborg: Bokförlaget Daidalos AB, 1997, p.241 
56 Ibid. p.141 
57 Ibid. p.55 
58 Ibid. p.127 
59 Ibid pp.113-14 
60 Boatcă, Manuela., ‘‘FROM THE STANDPOINT OF GERMANISM’’: A POSTCOLONIAL CRITIQUE OF WEBER’S 
THEORY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, Postcolonial Sociology - Political Power and Social Theory, Volume 24, p.56 
[doi:10.1108]  
61 Boatcă p.63 
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[…] a vulgar universalism that disregards specific historical experiences while 
subsuming them under the totalitarian grip of a Eurocentric unilinear evolutionist 
framework. Explicitly or implicitly, this evolutionist framework produces a 
particular notion of history which holds that African phenomena can only really be 
understood as mirroring an earlier European history.
62
 
 
Wai also argues that discourse established by using concepts like neopatrimonialism and state 
failure is a function of power, and constructs a reality that supports “the hegemonic power”iii, 
thereby, normalizing power relationships.
63
  
    As this critique mainly points to the Eurocentric basis for Weber’s theoretical framework, it 
is relevant to incorporate these considerations in relation to the factors identified as affecting 
the state-building process. However, according to the prescriptions of the world society, a 
state is able to gain legitimacy by conforming to a universalistic state model,
64
 thereby 
making the Webarian conceptual framework pertinent for analyzing factors that could affect 
such an establishment. 
 
4. Methodological framework  
 
A case study  
To identify factors affecting the state building process in Somalia, the methodology employed 
throughout the thesis is a single case study on one phenomenon; hence the study is small-
scale, but thick since focus is on one particular situation i.e. the state-building process in 
Somalia.
65
  The study aims at gaining contextual understanding of the case of Somalia, and 
not generating generalizing results.
66
 Case studies can be over-simplified resulting in that 
readers draw misleading conclusions, as they presume the result is descriptive of a whole 
situation instead of an entity of it.
67
 Therefore, this thesis stresses that focus is only put on one 
entity of the Somali society i.e. the process of reconstituting the state, and thus the aim is not 
to describe every aspect of the Somali society. 
Interview selection  
Different forms of literature (factsheets, articles and books) were read to get an insight into 
the situation in Somalia. This clarified the limitations (time, access to the field etc.) the study 
would have before “casting a net”, which means calling and e-mailing relevant interviewees.68 
                                                          
62 Wai p.33 
63 Ibid. p.41 
64 Meyer, Ohn W. ; Boli, John; Thomas, George M. and Ramirez, Francisco O., World Society and the Nation‐State, American Journal 
of  Sociology, Vol. 103., No. 1., 1997, p.148  
65 Merriam, Sharan B. Fallstudien som forskningsmetod. Trans. Björn Nilsson. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1994, p.24-28 
66 Ibid. p.45, 184 
67 Merriam p.45-48 
68 Crang, Mike and Cook, Ian. Doing ethnographies. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2011, pp.14-19 
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Since the situation in Somalia has been turbulent the possibilities to do an ethnographic study 
were nonexistent. Through such a method the process of reconstituting the Somali state could 
have been understood as it is experienced by people who live in the country.
69
 That this is not 
included could be seen as a limiting factor, as the study lacks firsthand observers to the effects 
of the state-building process within the country. Instead the study is based on interviews with 
so called “outside observers”, that can be seen as belonging to either the “Somali diaspora” or 
the “International community”. Since Somalia has a history of both internal and external 
involvement in the state-building process it was considered relevant to reflect voices from 
both of these communities. The categorization had a target-oriented basis, that is, interviewee 
selection was based on criteria identified as important for each group,
70
 which also served as 
the delimitations for this study. According to Chein target-oriented selections are conducted 
so that as much knowledge as possible is attained.
71
 Therefore, the criteria for the “Somali 
diaspora” was Somali ethnicity, knowledge of current Somali politics and residency in 
Sweden, whiles the group called the “International community” was delimited to non-ethnic 
Somalis, who have worked with issues concerning Somali state-building, peacekeeping, 
human rights and equivalent issues. However, none of the interviewees’ opinions are seen as 
representative for a larger community. Instead, the main objective is to accentuate their views. 
The aim was to comprehend what factors the interviewees, as outside observers perceived as 
affecting the reestablishment of the Somali state. As the interviewees have different 
relationships to Somalia they were able to give different perspectives to the situation. 
However, as the focus of this study is to identify factors that could affect the state-building 
process, the interview answers are not divided into two different groups, because they are not 
seen as two opposing groups in this matter.  
    The research question – What factors are important in the reconstitution of the Somali 
state? – became the foundation for the interview guides. To try to achieve a balance between 
what Katarina Sjöberg calls the researchers “inside understanding”iv and “outside 
understanding”,72 and thus limit the influence of bias the interview questions were based on 
knowledge gained from literature. Since, the interview guides were not followed rigorously 
the interviews became semi-structured.
73
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    Awareness of clan identity and suspicion between clans is a reality, and this could have 
become problematic when contacting interviewees with a Somali background. However, the 
first Somali interviewee opened doors, like a “gate-keeper”,74 to other interviewees with 
different genealogies. Thereby, these were so called snowball selections,
75
 but in accordance 
with characteristics composing the group “Somali diaspora”. E-mails were sent and phone 
calls were made to different governmental and international institutions, such as UN’s 
Swedish office, UI, EUSR for the Horn of Africa (HOA), FOI, to come in contact with 
interviewees that could constitute the group “International community”. However, only two 
interviewees were reached using this method; a researcher focused on the HOA and a 
diplomat. Through my supervisor I came into contact with a third interviewee; a lieutenant 
commander.  
    The majority of the interviews took place in Malmö. However, three interviews were 
conducted in Stockholm, Uppsala and Karlskrona. Only one of the nine interviews was 
carried out over the phone and all interviews besides the telephone interview was tape 
recorded. As the telephone interview was done in the end phase of this study the possibilities 
to travel to interviewee’s hometown were nonexistent. According to Bryman, a telephone 
interview does not have to be limiting if the interviewee is open and gives detailed answers,
76
 
which I feel was the case here. The remaining interviews took place where the interviewee 
proposed, which was mostly in offices, some at cafés and one took place at the home of an 
interviewee. The interviews lasted between 30 minutes (only 2) up to 120 minutes (only 2). 
Three of the interviews were conducted in Somali, one in English and the rest in Swedish. 
Translations can be problematic when doing interviews in a different language because of 
erroneous language translations.
77
 To prevent this, when difficulties occurred, the 
interviewees were asked to specify words and concepts during the interview or afterwards. 
After the material was transcribed it was categorized according to the main subjects that the 
interviewees identified as affecting the state-building process. The variety composing each 
category of interviewees enabled a nuanced identification of factors that could affect the 
reconstitution the Somali state. Their voices will serve as the basis for the analysis.  
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Ethical considerations  
Different research areas have established codes for ethical research,
78
 however, Alan Bryman 
states that the fundamental aspects of ethics is confidentiality, voluntariness, anonymity and 
integrity.
79
 Therefore, this study takes a starting point in these aspects in the discussion of 
research ethics.  
    In accordance with the information and consent criteria of ethical behavior within social 
science,
80
 all involved in this study were informed of the purpose of the study, the 
voluntariness of participation and their role in the study before the interviews took place.  
    According to Mike Crang and Ian Cook, the researcher cannot remember all that is said 
verbatim and constantly taking notes could be disturbing during the interview.
81
 Hence, this 
felt like the optimal reason for recording the interviews. Consent was given before the 
interviews were tape recorded, and the reason for recording was also stated. However, three of 
the interviewees wanted to be anonymous. Therefore, all personal information that could be 
traced back to the individual, such as names, hometown and specific workplaces are excluded 
in this study and in the transcribed material, in accordance with the definition of anonymity
v
 
made by the Swedish Research Councils ethical expert group.
82
 
    Furthermore, the criteria of confidentiality were considered in relation to all interviews, in 
accordance with article 23 in the Declaration of Helsinki 2008 that states:  
 
Every precaution must be taken to protect the privacy of research subjects and the 
confidentiality of their personal information and to minimize the impact of the 
study on their physical, mental and social integrity.
83
 
 
Thus, all recorded material was deleted after transcription and the transcribed material is 
stored safely.  
 
5. Brief historical background  
The following chapter intends to present a brief historical overview to highlight internal and 
external aspects of the state-building process in Somalia. Hence focus is on Somalia’s 
relationship to external actors, and the societal, political and economic transformation. 
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Pre-colonization: Traditional kinship society 
Before colonization Somalis lived in a stateless society, where the individual could only rely 
on kinship solidarity for help and security.
84
 Therefore, loyalty was offered first to those with 
common ancestry, this was a major obligation uniting a single clan. Clan, based on patrilineal 
principles
vi
, was the essential political entity, where agnatic
vii
 origin determined political 
alliances. However, these alliances were always fluid
85
 and the extent of the political 
community was defined through informal political-legal contracts (xeer
viii
), which were used 
to settle political and legal disputes, thus, reinforcing political loyalties.
86
 Moreover, within 
the community political authority was shared and political control was not centralized. 
Therefore, clan leaders, lacking executive powers and right to rule presided over the assembly 
of elders
ix
 (shir), and where responsible for inter-clan relationships and all other clan affairs. 
Furthermore, the societal concept of egalitarianism was fundamental. Thereby, all adult males 
were allowed to have a say in the institutionalized shir and were empowered to direct the 
policies of the lineage through a contractual treaty. A so called pastoral democracy existed, 
where all had the right to participate and decisions
x
 were based on consensus.
87
 Consequently, 
the traditional Somali autonomic pastoral-or agro-nomadic lifestyle, was related to the 
nomadic people’s autonomic relationship to the state.88 However, the construct of clan as a 
shared identity became a power tool used by colonialists, whereby clan came to be the only 
legal identity the Somalis could have by which they could gain access to the state.
89
  
 
1969-1995: From dictatorial rule to anarchy  
After a coup d'état in 1969 Gen. Mohamed Siyaad Barres military junta seizes power in 
Somalia and implements an ideology of “Scientific socialism”.90 Thus, a process of 
nationalizing crucial economic sectors
xi
 began, and different national development projects 
were introduced.
91
 By early 1970s the regime organized a repressive statewide control 
apparatus
xii
. Gradually, power became more centralized around the president, as the regime 
appointed people to political posts based on clan
xiii
. However, because of successful national 
development projects, and an ambition to reunite the Somali territory; including parts of 
                                                          
84 Schackt, Jon. ‘Folk och historia’. Trans. Lena Hagberg. In Lena Hagberg (ed.), Somalier : grundinformation. Norrköping: Statens 
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86 Ibid. pp.3-4 
87 Ibid. 
88 Schackt pp.6-7  
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Philadelphia, 2013 p.75 
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Europa Publications Ltd., 2002 pp.936-963. 
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Kenya (Northern Frontier District) and Ethiopia (Ogaden) with a Somali populations; the 
dictator gained popular support.
92
 Yet, Somali nationalistic strife for territorial reunification, 
created strained relationships to both Ethiopia and Kenya.
93
 Thus, in 1977 the Ethiopian-
Somalia War broke out. The Barre regime’s defeat against Ethiopia in 1978xiv was followed 
by a shift of ideology and alliances.
94
 With the inflow of refugees to the country, the loss from 
the war and the downward spiraling economy, the antagonism against the regime was 
accentuated.
95
 Subsequently, the Barre regime’s exercise of power changed character such 
that corruption and nepotism became rampant and people started fleeing the country on 
political grounds.
96
 To suppress political opponents and the public’s dissatisfaction, the 
regime implemented divide-and-rule policies, where feelings of clan affiliation were used to 
trigger and escalate competition, dissatisfaction and conflict among Somalis,
97
 thereby 
increasing people’s awareness of clan identity.98  
    In early 1980s US support – weapons, financial aid and generous loans – was offered to the 
Barre regime, because of their interest in the strategically located
xv
 naval base in Berbera. The 
American interest in the country also attracted other western supporters,
99
 and the support 
continued in spite of offences against human rights and deep rooted corruption.
100
 Thus, 
Somalia became dependent on western aid,
101
 as it was a major part of the economy.
102
 Yet, 
neither did this aid noticeably fuel industrial development nor improve living standards for the 
population. The only road to prosperity for the “common man” during the 1980s was through 
relatives who had access to development agency funds,
103
 and for the majority of Somalis, 
“the State” was an abstract entity that they were not a part of.104 Somalia’s strategic 
importance reduced with the end of the Cold War. Subsequently, the Barre regimes lost 
donated, financial capacity to uphold the state through patronage and coercion.
105
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    In 1991 the dictatorial regime was overthrown by oppositional groupings,
106
 leaving a 
power vacuum making it possible for the United Somali Congress (USC), led by Gen. 
Mohammed Farah Aidid, to seize power,
107
 which resulted in a power struggle between 
opponent clans.
108
 Food became a weapon, as militias enforced a man-made famine
109
 by 
looting food convoys and threatening relief workers among other things.
110
 The oppositional 
groupings “became another way to further clan interests with arms”111 by employing the same 
political tactics as Barre regime.
112
 According to Kapteijns, a “key shift” occurred, when 
political violence became communal violence. Through rationalized clan cleansing campaigns 
based on clan identity, people were turned against each other.
113
 And in 1992 the situation 
deteriorated, as clan antagonism deepened and the famine reached horrendous proportions, 
whereby the United Nations (UN) implemented the peacekeeping
xvi
 operation UNOSOM
xvii114
 
to help restore the countries nation state status. However, insecurity and continuous fighting 
hampered the relief efforts.
115
 Consequently, the US government approved Operation Restore 
Hope,
116
 a massive military intervention with humanitarian overtones,
117
 with the UN Security 
Councils authorization to use “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure 
environment for humanitarian relief”.118 In 1993 a ceasefire was agreed upon between the 
Somali political movements, but it was not preserved and conflicts occurred between 
militiamen and UNOSOM. Subsequently, several countries withdrew in 1994 followed by an 
entire withdrawal of the UN operation in 1995.
119
 Simultaneously, as the country fell apart 
due to the intra-state conflict, the clans claimed different regions in the country.
120
 Somalis 
formed proto-state systems in Somaliland, Puntland and alternative forms of order exist in 
other parts of the country today, which lack juridical status in the international community.
121
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1995-2008: Humanitarian and military interventions   
The international community showed reticence in their involvement in the country after the 
failed UN intervention.
122
 Meanwhile, the agenda of peace conferences, organized by 
international and regional actors, became dominated by warlords.
123
 However, in recent years 
the international and particularly American interest in Somalia was revitalized, as the country 
became a haven for al-Qaeda affiliated terrorism.
124
 Simultaneously, some elements of the 
Somali society were becoming radicalized; among them was the al-Qaeda linked al-Shabaab.  
     After a reconciliation conference in Kenya 2002-04, the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) was created, where the Ethiopian affiliated warlord triumphed. But, because political 
representation was built on genealogical formula (4.5
xviii
), as the basis of power-sharing, it 
was endorsed by the international community.
125
 Yet, the TFG had difficulties gaining control 
over the Somali territory,
126
 while several parts of the country fell under the control of Union 
of Islamic Courts (UICs).
127
 Hostile statements made by leaders of the rising UICs,
128
 and 
their seizure of the capital Mogadishu lead to a TFG supported Ethiopian intervention.
129
 
According to Brett Morash “the fall of Mogadishu to UIC was a serious issue in Washington 
and Addis Ababa as it meant to them that Somalia was preparing to become the next Taliban 
like state, coupled with the risk of making a play for Ogaden as well.”130 Even though the 
Ethiopian troops succeeded in retrieving the capital, groups like al-Shabaab still posed a threat 
to TFG.
131
 Therefore, the African Union (AU) launched the UN supported regional 
peacekeeping operation AMISOM in 2007, which aimed at stabilizing the situation in the 
country.
132
 However, terrorism was not the only problem facing the region that the 
international community had to contend with. Piracy had escalated in the Indian Ocean and 
Gulf of Aden, which has affected the vital international trading passing through the region.
133
 
Thus, in 2008 the European Union’s (EU’s) engagement in the HOA extended to security 
with the launch of the naval Operation Atalanta, which later has become a part of the EU’s 
comprehensive approach
xix
 in the country.
134
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6. The road to reconstituting the Somali state? 
After schematizing the interview material, three main factors were identified as affecting the 
reconstitution of the Somali state; political, social and economic. As these are intertwined, the 
factors will be interlinked in this following section to give an understanding of what 
implications they may have for the reconstitution of the Somali state. The aim of this section 
is to give an analysis of the interview material through a theoretical lens. Therefore this 
section is structured so that the main identified factors are presented and highlighted through 
the voices of the interviewees. Each of the presented factors is followed by an analysis based 
on the theoretical framework, thus, this section has combined the empirical material with a 
theoretical analysis. While presenting empirical findings, three people will remain 
anonymous, therefore they will be called: Somali A
xx
, Somali B and the diplomat. Besides the 
diplomat, two other people are categorized as belonging to the “International community”, 
lieutenant commander Kjell Augustzen and researcher Redie Bereketeab. In the presentation 
of empirical findings, their work titles will be used in front of their names, so that the voices 
of each group i.e. the “International Community” and the “Somali diaspora” are more 
noticeable. This section of the thesis will end with a short summary of the identified factors.  
 
The case of Somalia – a theoretical analysis  
There was unanimity between the interviewees in considering the political climate in Somalia 
today as complex. Furthermore, they distinguished similar reasons for this complexity. The 
following statement by Redie Bereketeab, a researcher of conflict and state-building in the 
HOA, highlights one of these reasons:  
 
Now the issue is; which are the constituting units of the federal state? It’s not 
clear how they are going to be shaped, and reshaped. We have a government in 
central Somalia, which is in Mogadishu. We have the case of Puntland, which has 
declared its autonomy for more than ten years, even though they are not claiming 
to secede from Somalia. At the end there is the issue of Somaliland, they have 
declared their independence and are claiming for complete separation. And on 
the south we have Jubaland, were at least recently, there has been what is now 
known as the Jubaland initiative, whereby the southern regions could constitute a 
federal entity within the Somali federation. And the issue within the ongoing 
18 
 
debate is who is going to have the upper hand; is it the central government in 
Mogadishu or the federal states?
135
  
 
Researcher Bereketeab expresses the challenges with power balance between the federal 
entities and the central government. Also problems of state legitimacy are indirectly 
expressed, as Somaliland has declared their independence. How the relationship between the 
self-declared independent region Somaliland and the central government will evolve seems 
problematic, as this region has been self-governing since 1991. Hence, the Somaliland 
government has gained the monopoly of legitimate use of force within this territory, which 
enables the regional government to uphold its order, according to the Weberian state model. 
With reference to Rousseau, the populations within these clan-based entities i.e. the regional 
territories have been able to establish a social contract as they were not able to survive in the 
state of nature that the Somali society returned to in conjunction with the outbreak of the civil 
war. Thereby the consolidation represents the populations general will, thus the question is: 
Why would the population break a social contract that has led to their prosperity and survival 
to consolidate a new contract? A new social contract, uniting the power of the whole Somali 
population might imply that the individual’s proprietorship of his possessions i.e. land and 
natural resources could change. Therefore it is questionable whether the central state will gain 
legitimacy within this region. The problem with legitimacy is also questioned by Warsame 
Yassin Osman, uttering that:  
 
Right now, the government is built on clan and not knowledge. It is important that 
you can count on the government, that it is transparent etc. They are merely 
symbolic.
136
  
 
     From a Weberian perspective, the lack of legitimacy which Yassin Osman emphasizes 
indicates that the post-transitional government is not seen as an authority. Thereby its 
enforcement of order will not become successful until it gains obedience from the people. 
However, gaining legitimacy through obedience in the central governments order might take 
time in lieu of Somalia’s history of corrupt and nepotistic governments. Furthermore, the state 
lacks ability to enforce its order within its jurisdiction, as proto-state systems are established. 
According to the Weberian state model the central government has to establish some sort of 
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authoritative rule within the regional areas to be able to include them in its territorial 
jurisdiction. 
    The challenge that the state it facing is also interlinked with the issue of rule of law, as 
Somali A expresses:  
 
It is worrying, how the state will handle this (federal entities) […] the regions 
have the right of self-determination according to the constitution, whiles it seems 
that the state does ad hoc attempts at going in and governing these parts.
137
  
 
Several interviewees have stressed the importance of rule of law, and how the population 
perceives the central government which is illustrated by the previous statement. This indicates 
that the central government tries to move beyond the authority it is granted by the 
constitution, from a Weberian standpoint. What is then its basis for legitimacy? According to 
Yassin Osman the government is based on clan and not merits, this signifies that the central 
government’s authority is based on kinship. As the central government is composed by all 
clans (4.5) the sanctity of tradition is the basis for legitimacy.  
    In reference to Foucault, how the power relationship will form between the central 
government and the federal entities also illuminates momentary relative strengths within a 
continuous struggle, which might be seen as decided by a deeper power structure within the 
Somali society i.e. clan. The clan structure has been institutionalized, as it is incorporated in 
both the private and the public sphere within the society. According to all Somali interviewees 
the clans has always had an important role for the individual, and also in the transformation of 
the Somali society, which was in agreement with the opinions of the “International 
community” as well. The following statement by Somali B clarifies this:  
 
With the civil war in Somalia, a void occurred when the state function 
disappeared. The individual thus sought affiliation and the clan filled the void of 
the state. […]His feeling of identity or self is coupled with the clan and not the 
nation.
138
  
 
Not only did the function of the clan change, but it replaced the functions of the state, which 
Asho Omar Geesdiir, former gender adviser and child protection coordinator for the TFG 
(2009) and chairlady of Somali National Woman Organization, highlights:  
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Before, they defended the culture, but now they are engaged in politics. Their 
social function is nonexistent; they used to solve disputes, defend women’s rights 
for example. Clan leaders protected people through dialogue, but after the war 
the warlord took, by arms, the role of the clan leaders.
139
   
 
Moreover, Omar Geesdiir asks: If you base a state on a clan system – How can I have the 
right to live were ever I want, buy a house, and engage in the politics in that area? How can I 
do that?
140
  
    In asking that question, Omar Geesdiir is referring to the different federal entities that are 
predominantly clan based, and the limitations people have with mobility within the country. 
The previous statements indicate both the relationship the individual has to his clan and the 
structural change of the clan function in which governments find support for their structure 
through the incorporation of clan, which has also been illustrated in the historical overview. 
According to Foucault’s concept of power, the continuous struggle within relative strengths 
i.e. the power relationship between central government and regional entities and their relative 
strengths can increase the chance for transformation of these relationships. This could mean 
that the dominant actor i.e. the central government that has gained international 
acknowledgement loses its dominant position. However, interpreting Weber, if the central 
government does not have authority within its territorial jurisdiction, and cannot uphold the 
monopoly of legitimate force to obtain order, then it cannot be seen as the dominant actor 
within the power relationship. As both regional governments and the central government find 
support in the clan structure, the clan structure can be seen as the regime of truth which they 
use to support their power exercise. By accepting the clan structure as truth, knowledge is 
utilized by both the regional governments and the central government to improve their 
position within the relative strengths. On the other hand, by identifying a certain union of 
people i.e. a government (X) as representative of a clan (Y), thus the representative 
government gains deontic power, which is rights and obligations, however, this requires that 
this institutional fact is collectively accepted. If the central government or the regional 
governments are not collectively accepted as representative of the clan, then they lack deontic 
power. Thereby, their authority i.e. their deontic power is nonexistent within a territorial 
jurisdiction. Then according to Weber, the citizens do not see the state as legitimate, and it 
will therefore not survive. 
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    Another recurring factor that was mentioned during the interviews was the role of different 
international actors in their involvement in the Somali state-building process. Lieutenant 
commander Kjell Augustzen states that: Then, there is the image now that there are many 
stakeholders when there are natural resources that can be extracted.
141
 Further lieutenant 
commander Augustzen point to the importance of dialogue: You have to have an open 
dialogue with all nations who have an interest in Africa; an open dialogue in which the UN is 
involved.
142
 However, researcher Bereketeab emphasizes an important question when it comes 
to nations implicit motives for intervening:  
 
How do you weigh your motives, are your motives helping the Somali people or is 
your motives your own national interests? Now, these are the crucial questions 
that have to be asked whenever someone intervenes, what is the motive, what is 
the driving reason pushing that actor to intervene.
143
 
     
In retrospect Somalia’s geopolitical importance during the Cold War and in the War against 
terror, these questions are relevant, as they indicate what the implicit reasons for foreign 
interventions can be. Some of the Somali interviewees mentioned that international actors 
have their own interests for involving themselves in the process of state-building, and that 
these interests do not coincide with what is best for the population. Interpreting Foucault, this 
might indicate a power relationship between the intervening actors and the intervened party. 
Intervening actors find support from certain regimes of truth i.e. humanitarian, military etc. 
that enables them to motivate their exercise of power, thus legitimizing their actions to 
enforce a certain order in a country. As the dominating actor, they actively guard their 
interests, since a transformation in the relative strengths might imply that their dominant 
position shifts. Thereby, the regime of truth that supports their actions might change 
character, and thus shifting the hegemony towards the subordinate actor. But, it has to be 
emphasized that several actors have different agendas for involvement in a country, thus, 
several relative strengths exist simultaneously both inside and outside a country, within 
continues struggle, all trying to gain the position as the dominant actor.  
        The distrust between Somalis, caused by divide-and-rule policies and the clan war, was 
another factor that was frequently mentioned during the interviews. According to the 
interviewed diplomat, the question of land ownership has been unsolved since the beginning 
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of the civil war. Therefore the challenge is of trying to find a common idea about what kind of 
society they want, where everyone has the same rights and obligations.
144
 How will such a 
common idea be accomplished? With reference to Searle it might be possible if the Somali 
people collectively assign their society with certain values, a common idea. However, 
according to Rousseau, to create a common idea of what kind of society the entire Somalia 
will be, a new social contract might have to be established between the central government 
and the people, which could result in a change in proprietorship. Land ownership has been a 
contested question, Somali B stated that: Property has to be returned. It is important for the 
peace process between the clans.
145
 As the safeguarding of peoples proprietorship of their 
possessions is one of the reasons for establishing a social contract the proto-state might have 
to break its social contract with people within its territory to resolve the question of land 
ownership. By not solving the question of land ownership a social contract between the 
central government and the Somali people might not be established. 
    The diplomat states that the state should not be equivalent with Mogadishu.
146
 During the 
Barre regime everything i.e. universities, governmental offices etc. was located in the capital, 
which is something that has also been emphasized by the Somali interviewees, If people 
worry that the government will limit its focus to the central part of the country, this might 
strengthen the power the proto-states hold, thereby making it difficult for the central 
government to establish a social contract with its population, a social contract based on people 
believing that their union will lead to survival and prosperity. 
     The minimal involvement of women in public affairs, the lack of education and 
infrastructure were also factors brought up during the interviews. Several interviewees stated 
that these are challenges facing the process of rebuilding the country, which are interlinked 
with the economy. The state’s ability to insure security, basic needs etc. is based on economy, 
which several of the interviewees brought up. Researcher Bereketeab states that:  
 
The challenge, for the emerging federal government is; how do you build a 
military force, the security intelligence and police force, which are professional, 
which are accountable to the civilian government in Mogadishu? Now, as we 
know, there are many international agencies training the Somali army. But, at the 
end the Somali government has to be able to train its one army, it has to take the 
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responsibility of training, organizing its own military, own security forces, its own 
intelligence forces. 
 
To be able to endow its people with security as well as basic needs, a state must possess a 
capacious economic base. Because in order to get legitimacy from its own people then the 
government has to be able to give those services, according to researcher Bereketeab. The 
central government therefore needs to uphold monopoly of the legitimate use of force, from a 
Weberian standpoint. Moreover, the population will not feel personal loyalty; which is the 
basis for obedience in states with traditional authority; if the central government does not 
achieve this. But, the chaotic situation in the country might be beneficial to some actors, 
which is highlighted by Somali B’s statement:  
 
These people who enriched themselves in the chaos, oligarchs, these rich, rich 
people; smuggle, money launder, loot, sell drugs, confiscate arable land from the 
little people, the farmers. They are corrupt. These people who profited during this 
anarchic time they do not want peace. They have money.
147
  
 
Hereby the question is: what kind of livelihood options are there for the people, if war 
economy is the only economy that exists? How will the government be able to give basic 
services to the people and thereby gain legitimacy? According to Tilly no means of coercion 
has been concentrated by the central government, as it is unable to stabilize order within the 
country, furthermore it lacks the economic resources to enable such an order. But, Yassin 
Osman questions the reason for there not being any other economy, as he states:  
 
Why is a country aid dependent, when their country has everything; ocean, arable 
land etc. But we don’t use it. Somalis have to start using it. From donors the 
country may for example get cheap rice, thus the rice grower in the country stops 
producing rice, as he doesn’t earn a living on it anymore.148  
 
This statement also highlights a power relationship between a donor country and the receiving 
country, where the receiving country becomes subordinate in such a relationship as it is 
dependent on donations for its survival. Therefore, to ensure the survival of the citizens, 
which is an aspect of the social contract, the government has to generate internal growth. 
Otherwise the social contract can be seen as breached. Moreover, Yassin Osman points out 
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that the Somali people themselves have to change the relative strengths by using their natural 
and human resources. The power of the people was an aspect highlighted by all the 
interviewees, as they stated that unless the Somali people are determinate to reconstitute the 
state, then the external support might not help in achieving this goal. Within all of the theories 
employed the people are the actors who for example, establish a social contract, collectively 
assign certain functions with status, constitute both the state and power relationships.  
 
The highlighted factors  
Looking at the quotes above, several factors are seen as affecting the state-building process in 
Somalia. Politically, the power relationship between the central and the regional entities is 
highlighted, where questions of legitimacy is raised. The mistrust between clans and the 
influence of clan is also problematized; how much influence should clan have in politics? The 
question of international actors and their role in the state-building process is also emphasized; 
what are the motives behind their involvement in the country?  
    Socially, the function of the clan has transformed, and the clan based geographical areas 
limit people’s mobility. The poor infrastructure, lack of education and limited involvement of 
women in the transformative process are all social dimensions that affect the state-building 
process. Additionally, security is also an emphasized problem facing the post-transitional 
government in its establishment and the population, which is interlinked with economy.   
    Finally, the country has economic obstacles to overcome; the establishment of a non-war 
economy that is not based on criminality and simultaneously, utilizing the natural and human 
resources that exist to become donor independent.  
 
7. The Eurocentric discourse  
Is African phenomena only understood as mirroring an earlier European history, where 
modern Western states are a dichotomy to traditional societies? Looking at the highlighted 
factors they can be interpreted as concepts that mirror the conceptual framework of state 
rationality, as they relate to concepts of legitimacy, state-building, social contract among 
others that are based on so called Eurocentric theories. Simultaneously, as these concepts are 
used as a frame of reference defining countries, they have become universalistic models, all 
other countries try to adapt to. However, the evolution of the state-building process can be 
seen as contextual, since the concept of state, as an institutional fact, is based on collectively 
accepted rules. Thus, the reconstitution of a Somali state, and the shape it will take, depends 
on how the Somali people collectively assign certain functions to the state, thereby giving it a 
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specific status, with reference to Searle. But, the state also needs international 
acknowledgment, thus, it has to transform itself according to the universalistic models so that 
the “hegemonic powers” do not find this establishment illegitimate, thereby, the state might 
disregard its historical experiences, according to Wai. So it is questionable whether traditional 
societies will ever gain the equivalent status as so called modern Western states within the 
world community. As “modern states” are still evolving they are outgrowing the definition of 
the Weberian ideal state; the gap to modernity will grow farther in relation to “traditional 
societies”. Thus, the concept of the modern state can also be seen as evolving; adopting to the 
benefit of “hegemonic powers” in the global economy. So as we live in a world consisting of 
power relationships that are relative strengths within a continuous struggle, according to 
Foucault, the dominant actors’ exercise of power is supported by regimes of truth, such as the 
concept of the modern state. However, without our collective acceptance of these regimes, 
thus, assigning them with a certain status function, they would not exist. Therefore the 
question of what factors are seen as important for the reconstitution of the Somali state might 
depend on how the country will adopt to the transforming standards of universalistic state 
models.  
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Endnotes  
                                                          
i
 Neo-liberalism refers to advocacy of the minimalistic state, and the rights of the individual against those of the 
state (see neo-liberalist as Robert Notzick, Friedrich Hayek). The view is influenced by classical liberalism 
(Scott, John and Marshall Gordon (ed.). Oxford dictionary of Sociology. 3
ed 
ed. revised, New York: Oxford 
University press, 2009 p.509) 
ii
 Neopatrimonialism: patron-client relationships, where support (e.g. investments, votes) is given to a particular 
political party (or equivalent) and the supporters gain security and/or access to different benefits etc. 
iii
 Hegemony refers to “the production of ways of thinking and seeing, and excluding alternative visions and 
discourses” (Scott, John and Marshall Gordon (ed.). Oxford dictionary of Sociology. 3ed ed. revised, New York: 
Oxford University press, 2009 p.306) 
iv
 “Inside understanding” and “Outside understanding “– my own translation from Swedish; originally called: 
inifrånförståelse and utifrånförståelse.  
v
 “Anonymization or anonymous assumes that the coupling between samples or answers to a questionnaire and a 
specific individual has been eliminated so that either unauthorized or research group can restore it. No one can 
thus combine e.g. a specific task with a specific individual's identity. The code list is destroyed. Anonymity can 
also be achieved by making the collection of materials without a specific individual's identity is recorded.” 
(Gustafsson, Hermerén and Petterson p.67: my own translation)  
vi
 The clan-name is based on a common male ancestor. The traditional clan structure and genealogy of the Somali 
society is traced to two brothers; Soomaal and Sab. The clan-families traced to Soomaal led mostly a pastoral-
nomadic life, whilst clans traced to Sab led an agro-nomadic life. Descendants of Sab are Raxanweyn and Digil, 
whilst the clan-families Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye and Daarood can be traced back to Soomaal. The Somali society 
mainly constitutes of these six clan groups (see Issa-Salwe p.2).   
vii
 Agnatic means to be related on one’s fathers side  
viii
 Xeer (sometimes spelled Heer) is customary law  
ix
 All adult males are elders.  
x
 After lengthy discussions decisions were based on consensus.  
xi
 During 1975 a system of renewable land-leasing was introduced, which was tarnished by corruption and 
manipulation. After 1991, the issue of land (and blood debt) became an important and contentious part of the 
intra-state conflict, which has not yet been resolved.  
xii
 State-control apparatus i.e. in the form of a dreaded counterintelligence; National Security Service; “special” 
secret prisons among other things   
xiii
 MOD – three clans; Ogaden, Marehan and Dhulbahante; constituted President Barres most important support  
xiv
 The Ogaden War (1977-1978): a war between the Ethiopian and the Somali government, where Somalia 
losses Soviet patronage to Ethiopia, which led to the Somali break with USSR and a strengthening of 
relationship with the USA (see Ofcansky p.937). 
xv
 The port city has an inflow the Red Sea and Suez Canal  
xvi
 According to the principles of UN peacekeeping, no operation can be deployed without the consent of the 
main parties of a conflict 
xvii
 UNOSOM mandate was for the political aspects and for humanitarian assistance in Somalia   
xviii
 4.5 formula means that 1 quota of the seats in Parliament is given to each of the four majority clans, whiles a 
quota of 0.5 seats are appointed to a coalition of minority clans.  
xix
 EU:s comprehensive approach in the HOA – The thought behind is that the cooperation and coordination of 
security and development in a country will lead to more efficiency (Frisell, Lindell and Skeppström, p.11)  
xx
 To anonymize the Somali interviewees they are called A, B. These are letters chosen because they are the first 
two in the alphabet. Since the occupation of the interviewees belonging to the “International community” is 
relevant for this study, as it aims to reflect their voices, the anonymized interviewees’ profession is mentioned. 
However, all other information is excluded so that the specific identity of the person is concealed. 
 
No reference after the endnote implies that the endnote has the same reference as the sentence where 
you can find it. 
